The distribution of corporate control depends onthe comparative specificity of the factors of production that form the corporation as a firm and on how the planning of the enterprise's activity is constructed. While physical capital or a significant part of it is almost always a specific investment, other factors of production can more or less specialize, that is, become specific, depending on a number of reasons, for example, technological features production process, the information structure of the firm, corporate culture, marketing planning, the state of the markets of the relevant production factors, the availability of mechanisms for ensuring the interests stavschikov specific factors are not the owners of the company, and so on. n.
Taking into account the ability of economicagents to influence the political process, it can be assumed that the marketing management in the matter of selection of suppliers of financial resources and organization of relations with them, the management of firms will direct to ensure their own interests, including by influencing regulatory bodies and legal norms.
Proceeding from this assumption, let us turn to the peculiarities of the modern Russian economy and Russian enterprises.
Among the characteristic features of the Sovieteconomy, which is largely inherited the Russian economy, were peculiar and unique in size and industry structural imbalances, the central planning of the company. All this was combined with bureaucratization of the management of industry, equalization, the lack of effective incentive mechanisms for workers. Perhaps, practically in the middle of the 80s, the hopelessness of this direction of development became clear. The need for a profound transformation has been both at the micro level, where the master planning of the company, and at the macro level, which meant that the structural transformation of the economy as a whole. But the structural reorganization of the economy was a very large-scale problem, the solution of which was politically stable, which was absent in the country. It is not surprising that the authors of the reforms preferred to focus on the formal side of the property relations reform, hoping that it will become a catalyst for structural change.
The result of this approach has become, dynamicallythe growing contradiction between the structural parameters of the economy of the country and attempts to "push" it towards the transition to market planning of the enterprise. This was particularly evident in the sectors with the highest level of monopolization, narrow specialization, and technologically backward ones. The fact is that the human capital of these industries actually has the character of a specific factor of production. The termination of its interaction with other factors, the closure of firms will lead to the fact that the majority of workers will not be able to find work, that is, they will not be able to realize their human capital. Meanwhile, the attraction of these enterprises financing is possible only if the supplier of capital establishes control over them and further deep restructuring, because in their current state these enterprises can not be profitable.
At the same time, the state must inevitably acceptrole of the main intermediary in the economy in order to neutralize the negative consequences of the distorted structure of the economy and financial flows in it, to stimulate the transition to modern strategies of market development.
